O presente ensaio resulta de uma indagação introdutória e parcimoniosa acerca da transformação da mundividência científica e epistemológica no século XX. Em primeira instância, são analisados os conceitos fundacionais da Relatividade Restrita e da Relatividade Geral, visando elencar as principais dissonâncias entre a proposta científica de Albert Einstein e a cosmovisão estabelecida pela física clássica. De seguida, é invocada a célebre experiência de Edwin Hubble, responsável pela origem da Teoria do Big-Bang. Como não poderia deixar de ser, esta é também (...) alvo de uma examinação cuidadosa. Por fim, a reflexão estende-se ao domínio indeterminista da mecânica quântica, com o propósito de perscrutar os seus princípios fundamentais. Por forma a assegurar o cumprimento deste desígnio, o trabalho não se furta à exigência de aflorar certos traços elementares das doutrinas de Niels Bohr e Werner Heisenberg. Em suma, o breve estudo que aqui se presentifica procura, sobretudo, trazer à coação os elementos teóricos que ancoram o entendimento da física e da cosmologia nos nossos dias, problematizando, quando necessário, algumas das suas inferências. (shrink)

Este artigo disserta, sob o ponto de vista dos estudos de ‘exegese bíblica’, sobre um antigo e intrincado conceito que foi transmitido ao Cristianismo Primitivo, no primeiro século cristão, pela tradição hebraica, através da famosa tradução da “Septuaginta”, no IV século a.C. no Egito Ptolomaico, onde vivia e rezava uma grande Comunidade Judaico-Helenista. A Verdade’ constituiu-se um conceito-chave para as experiências religiosas desde o Mito até as mais sofisticadas pretensões de revelação divina, como o Judaísmo, o Cristianismo e o Islamismo. (...) Enfocamos aqui, em particular, a proximidade semântica destes ambientes helenizados na ‘Ásia Menor’ com a terminologia utilizada nos textos das Tradições de S.Paulo e, especialmente de S.João (Evangelho e Cartas), que relacionam Cristo, Espírito e Igreja ao âmbito da ‘verdade’. (shrink)

St. Augustine doesn't see in the crisis of the Pagan City the simple occasion of revenge, but the 'kairós' of an innovation that emerges among 'debris'. Without needing from the resource to the 'Phoenix', the Christian truth of the eternity, for Christ's Resurrection, communicates to the time limited and not repeat a new horizon. This 'new times' is apt to cross the things street and mutants, and so, the own 'death of the city' does not determine more 'death of man'. (...) The inspiration of The City of God is not a political projection in the way that we know in classical grec-latin culture. In the 'De Civitate Dei', on the contrary, Saint Augustine serves the Christian faith and of the Gospel to explain this mission of the city of God peregrine in time. (shrink)

Este artigo visa apresentar o estudo das relações de identidade no Cristianismo Antigo a partir da recepção de Elementos do Helenismo Religioso. Estas confluências, advindas anteriormente das relações com o Judaísmo da Diáspora, no Egito Ptolomaico (LXX – séc. IV a.C), são consolidadas com a formação geopolítica e religiosa da Expansão do Cristianismo na Ásia Menor, durante o IIo século. Através da exposição de ‘The Religious Context of Early Christianity’ (KLAUS, 2000) abordaremos as vicissitudes da Religião Helênica em mutação entre (...) a Filosofia da Felicidade e o Retorno do Divino Absoluto no Gnosticismo. Em diálogo com um tradicional estudo sobre a ‘atmosfera’ antiga nas relações entre a Gnose antiga, o Judaísmo e o Cristianismo (MINNERATH, 1973) serão traçadas as vias expostas pela obra de Klauck. No dizer do autor, trata-se de empreender um percurso que nos permita descortinar o ‘inteiro horizonte’ (KLAUS, 2000. p. 6) do Gnosticismo. (shrink)

The Current research seeks the study of the identity relationships in the early Christianity starting from the reception of Elements of the Religious Hellenism. These confluences advents previously of the relationships with the Judaism of Diaspora, in Egito Ptolomaico (LXX. séc. IV a.C), they are consolidated with the formation geopolitics and religious person of the Expansion of the Christianity in Minor Asia, during IIo Century. Through the exhibition of ‘The Religious Context of Early Christianity’ (KLAUS, 2000) we will approach Hellenistic’s (...) Religion vicissitudes in mutation between the Philosophy of the Happiness and ‘the Return of the Divine Absolute’ in Gnosticism. (shrink)

This study aims to analyze, genealogically, a sort of introductory topology of the problems of government at the thought of Foucault, especially as regards the conditions of possibility and the most relevant features of the invention of the concept biopolitics. What is the purpose here is not the simple application of the concepts in their historical perspectives, but to make the mapping of the concepts, the course on Foucault. For this, the governments in association with the pastoral power, with the (...) geneses and development of policial economy. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that the transcendental idealism of Husserl’s phenomenology is compatible with a metaphysical realism. I not only develop an argument regarding the consistency between both philosophical stances, but I argue that this was Husserl’s own thesis. As a consequence, I support my interpretation on a hermeneutic of some of the most important texts by Husserl himself, where he deals directly with the issue.

In this paper, I assess Husserl's reading of Descartes. I argue that Husserl's relationship with Descartes was a crucial element in the development of his own idea of transcendental phenomenology. I try to show that Husserl was not sensitive to the Cartesian questioning about the being of the ego sum and, from there, I argue that the ontological drift contained in Descartes does not give in to the Husserlian criticisms of “transcendental realism” and of being the precursor of “psychologism.” I (...) characterize this limitation of the Husserlian reading as the blind spot of his appraisal of Descartes. Next, I try to show how there is an ontological horizon that Descartes only foresees and that Husserl does not see at all, locking himself into his doctrines of the temporal self-constitution of transcendental subjectivity and the ego as “absolute fact.” Finally, I argue that the horizon of being and its expression as a “there is” and not an “I am” remains irreducible to both Cartesian doubt and Husserlian epoche. I draw from this situation some theses about the space of a fundamental ontology above the regional ontic spheres of Husserl's system of a priori, eidetic knowledge. (shrink)

A evolução dos meios de comunicação propiciou um massivo fluxo informacional, trazendo consigo alguns entraves. O fenômeno das fake news é produto dessa mudança na sociedade, afetando de diversas formas a vida das pessoas e inclusive a possibilidade de uma escolha plena e livre de influências, sua liberdade de expressão, pensamento e informação. Nesse contexto, este evento se torna gravoso para o nosso Estado Democrático, na medida que influencia o comportamento, as escolhas políticas, a conduta social e a solidez da (...) própria democracia. Diante do exposto, o objetivo do presente trabalho é refletir como as fake news interferem no Estado Democrático de Direito no Brasil e o deformam. Trata-se de uma revisão bibliográfica, documental e qualitativa. Propõe-se, por meio desse estudo, explicitar o que é esse fenômeno tão complexo das fake news e compreender as diversas formas de como ele pode afetar nosso sistema democrático, baseando-se nas ideias discursivas de Habermas. (shrink)

This book is dedicated to clarify ambiguous concepts from the world of creativity and innovation. One of the initial triggers for the development of the book was the perceived ambiguity of the binomials Design vs. Design Thinking and Innovation vs. Invention. Frequently, designers and innovation consultants are questioned by their clients about the relationships between these kind of concepts. Has the second emerged through the first, or vice-verse? Is one part of the other? Where are the similarities and which are (...) the differences? This conceptual incomprehension makes itself noticeable between many ambiguous concepts in the world of innovation and creativity. What is the difference between Radical and Disruptive Innovation? Or is Social Innovation the same as Social Intervention? And regarding Creativity, are Creativity and Creative Thinking the same? In this book the reader will find answers to these kinds of questions and doubts. 28 authors from 10 different countries and cultural backgrounds are questioning current definitions and perceptions, by comparing different sources and ideas, or simply by giving their personal opinions. Some of the authors have an academic background, others a practical one, being either entrepreneurs, working with innovation in companies, or being innovation/design consultants. (shrink)

En este documento, debato ampliamente sobre la fenomenología de la intersubjetividad presentada por Husserl y por Sartre, centrándome en los conceptos de empatía y ser-para-otros. Contrariamente a la opinión más común, rechazo la objeción de solipsista dirigida a Husserl y sostengo que es la descripción de Sartre la que da lugar a esa objeción, en la medida en que él describe la conciencia de otro sujeto como una forma de autoconocimiento como un "objeto" (para "otros"). Termino señalando algunas directrices para (...) convertir el análisis de Husserl de la aprehensión de otros sujetos en una fenomenología de la comunicación del más alto nivel. (shrink)

In this paper, I discuss the possible relations between Fritz London’s account of the status of the observer in quantum physics and transcendental phenomenology. Firstly, I discuss Steven French’s interpretation of London’s thesis as a phenomenological account of the status of the observer, along with the objections Otávio Bueno has brought forward. Secondly, refusing in part both French’s and Bueno’s theses for several reasons, I propose another way of reading London’s thesis in the framework of transcendental phenomenology. Namely, I put (...) London’s account of the observer against the backdrop of Husserl’s analyses of the objectifying acts and objectual constitution. Finally, I end this article with some criticisms of what seems to me the ontological indigency of the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum physics, to whose “spirit” London also belongs. (shrink)

In this paper, I start with the opposition between the husserlian project of a phenomenology of the experience of time, started in 1905, and the mathematical and physical theory of time, as it comes out from the special theory of relativity, by Einstein, in the same year. Although the contrast between the two approaches is apparent, my aim is to show that the original program of Husserl’s time theory is the constitution of an objective time and a time of the (...) world, starting from the intuitive giveness of time, i.e., from time as it appears. To show this, I stress the structural similarity between the original question of time, by Husserl, and the problem of a phenomenology of the space constitution, as it was first developed in the husserlian manuscripts of the XIX century, in which we find the threefold question of the origin of our space representation, of the geometrization of intuitive space and the constitution of transcendent world space. Finally, I reconsider some of Husserl’s main theses about the phenomenological constitution of objective time in the light of the main results of special relativity time-theory, introducing several corrections to central assumptions that underlie Husserl’s theory of time. (shrink)

This article deals with the conscious and unconscious dimensions of mental life. I distinguish the transitive sense of consciousness, being conscious of something, intentionality, from the adjectival or adverbial sense, being conscious or consciously directed towards something. I show that an intentional act can be conscious or unconscious in the second sense and argue that, from this position, we can ask good questions about what consciousness is and its function in mental life. To achieve this result, I begin by framing (...) the topic in the tradition of psychology before Husserl, namely Lipps, and Brentano, and then describe the unconscious dimension from the conceptual apparatus of phenomenology. (shrink)

I discuss Husserl’s concept of norm, and its relevance for a phenomenology of practical reason. I confront Husserl with Wilhelm Wundt, Hans Kelsen, and Carl Schmitt about, respectively, what a norm is, about the relation between theoretical and normative sciences, and, finally, about the creation of political concepts within European culture. In the last section, I develop some theoretical insights about the constitutive character of normative consciousness, abandoning Searle’s distinction between constitutive and regulative rules. I stress also the importance of (...) a phenomenology of plural and collective subjectivity in order to develop a phenomenological theory of state and normative experience. (shrink)

In this paper, I present the main traits of the phenomenological thinking of Abranches de Soveral. I start with the work of his master Miranda Barbosa explaining the criticisms he address to the Husserlian phenomenology. I show Soveral’s approach to phenomenology is framed by the conceptions of Barbosa and the problems that, for him, phenomenology cannot answer in an accurate way. In this context, I present the fundamental tenets of Soveral’s rejoinder to his master, showing how phenomenology can be rearranged (...) in order to formulate and to answer “the fundamental problem of knowledge”. (shrink)

In the first part of this paper we try to show how the discussion of Meinong’s distinction between distributed and undistributed objects was crucial for Husserl’s thinking about the phenomenology of time consciousness. The criticism of Meinong’s thesis that the representation of a distributed object (temporal object) is an undistributed act is presented as the central point for the development of Husserl’s own thesis about the perception as a continuum of continua and about consciousness as an unitary flux of temporal (...) phases. In a second part, we move to Brentano’s theory about original associations in the constitution of the “presence-time”. Brentano’s position about the function of phantasy as the origin of our representation of time is refused by Husserl and, as a result, the structural composition of time consciousness in phases of primal-impression, fresh memory (later “retention”) and immediate expectation (later “protention”) appears as the core form to the intuition of the present and the constitution of time. In a last section, we follow Husserl’s revision of his own analysis of fresh memory in order to understand his final position about retention as a primitive form of Vergegenwärtigung. (shrink)

I offer an outline of an integrated phenomenological analysis of free fantasy and of fictional worlds. My main concern amounts to stress the scissions entailed in free fantasy and in the consciousness of fictional objects: a scission of the I, and a scission of the experience. Firstly, I offer a somewhat new characterization of the presence of the objects of free fantasy, which disconnects any possible relationship of those objects with a real perception as the leading form of an originally (...) giving consciousness. My leading example is daydream. Secondly, I take the Husserlian analysis of neutralization as a conceptual tool to explain the consciousness of fictional worlds, against a new tendency for interpreting these worlds in light of the concept of “possible world”. The two approaches converge to a twofold characterization of the mode of being of fictions and of the modality of presence of the objects of fantasy. (shrink)

I sketch an analysis of observing as a particular attitude one can take regarding the surrounding world. I stress some particular features of observation, like the cancelling of the vital engagement. in the world, and the delight that pure observation involves. Then I move to a description of figurative consciousness and its image-world. In the final part, 1 try to show how watching movies displays a new type of observation, based on the empathic connection with the characters, the emergence of (...) a virtual body, and a self-decentered life, where the ego is not an onlooker, but something like an “ in-looker”. (shrink)

In this paper, I start with the opposition between the Husserlian project of a phenomenology of the experience of time, started in 1905, and the mathematical and physical theory of time as it comes out of Einstein’s special theory of relativity in the same year. Although the contrast between the two approaches is apparent, my aim is to show that the original program of Husserl’s time theory is the constitution of an objective time and a time of the world, starting (...) from the intuitive giveness of time, i.e., from time as it appears. To show this, I stress the structural similarity between Husserl’s original question of time and the problem of a phenomenology of space constitution as it was first developed in the his manuscripts from the nineteenth century, in which we find the threefold question of the origin of our representation of space, of the geometrization of intuitive space, and of the constitution of transcendent world space. Finally, I reconsider some of Husserl’s main theses about the phenomenological constitution of objective time in light of the main results of special relativity time-theory, introducing several corrections to central assumptions that underlie Husserl’s theory of time. (shrink)

Based on the concept of intentionality, I argue for an integrative view of mental life as a higher function of the living organism, beyond the classical oppositions and dualisms between mind and body. Next, I claim in thesis that Phenomenology has never truly isolated and addressed the problem of consciousness, given the persistent confusion between it and intentionality. Similarly, I also isolate attention from consciousness and argue, based on experience, for the existence of both conscious and unconscious mental processes. In (...) the third section, I attempt a phenomenological description of consciousness as such, showing its high impact on mental life. Finally, some remarks are made about the difference between the concept of consciousness I propose and the classical analyses on qualia and sentience. (shrink)

In what follows, I intend to address an issue which is at the boundaries of the phenomenological method of reflective explication, and that, in this sense, points to some limitations of the phenomenological approach to consciousness and mind. I am referring to an aporetic situation that is at the heart of the phenomenological analysis of passivity. On the one hand, phenomenology shows, at least indirectly, a passive life that is beyond the first steps of the activity of the ego in (...) the receptive, affective life. This is something that is beyond the rising of an ego, and from which a phenomenology of the ego-form of subjective life could be addressed. On the other hand, the analytic and conceptual tools of the phenomenological method have no grips on this basic realm of subjective life. As a result, Husserl’s analysis of passivity starts with the evidence of a pre-affective, pre-egoic realm, from which a phenomenology of the ego could be developed. However, Husserl’s analyses end up with the denegation of this dimension, as if it was invisible for the phenomenological method. As a consequence, the starting point of the analysis is not passivity proper, but rather the primitive forms of receptivity, which is already a first layer of the activity of the ego. Instead of an analysis of the ego-polarization (the “birth” of the ego), the egoic layer of conscious life is simply presupposed. A phenomenology of the ego-form is, thus, at the same time promised and denied. This aporetic situation is visible in the alteration of the concept of a passive pre-givenness in Husserl’s Analysis Concerning Passive Synthesis. (shrink)

I discuss, from a phenomenological point of view, the distinction between judgments and norms. I stress the limits of the husserlian canonical analysis in order to rightly account for the sense and content of normative intentionality. Based on some Kelsian insights, I draw a clear distinction between judgments and norms, criticizing some classical trends coming from Husserl himself that consider norms as a kind of intentionality founded upon objectifying acts. However, taking distance from Kelsen, Kaufmann, and Cossio, I stress that (...) the ought-proposition (Sollsatz) cannot be a good rendering of the sense-content of norms, based on the phenomenological distinction between the intentional matter and the quality of intentional acts. Finally, I propose my own account based on the concept of ‘ductive force’. I stress that the ductive force of norms cannot be identified witb simple coercion. [ show that there is, even inside the juridical sphere, a variety of ductive forces, going from sheer coercion to council and recommendation. To end, I stress the centrality of the concept of “ductive force” for a phenomenology of the social world. (shrink)

In this article, I start with an analysis of Husserl’s description of the intentional structure of communicative intentions in the Logical Investigations, pointing to some obvious shortcomings of it. Then, I stress some important criticisms of Husserl’s approach, namely by Pfänder, and I endeavor to show that Husserl was very close to a full-fledged theory of communicative intentions in the years around 1910. I then turn to Reinach’s theory of social acts, without deciding whether Reinach’s approach was dependent or not (...) on Husserl’s new views concerning the intentionality of communicative acts. Regarding Reinach’s theory of the Vernehmung, I criticize a widespread trend to construe it as something like a perception, showing that it expresses what I call the “vocative element” of the communicative acts. Then, I point to some complements that Reinach’s description is in need, and I finish with an outline of a phenomenologically oriented concept of communication, based on Husserl’s and Reinach’s insights. (shrink)

In this paper, I examine phenomenologically the structure of the normative noema, which I call the “nomothetic noema.” I distinguish the meaning content, its normative characters, which I call “ductive forces”, and its modes of givenness. Next, I introduce the traditional difference between modalities de re and de dicto. I argue that the current tendency, in deontic logic, to treat deontic expressions as operators over sentences induces, at least on the syntactic surface, a de dicto reading. I then discuss some (...) of the theoretical decisions that underlie deontic logic, starting from two basic asymmetries between modal alethic logic and deontic logic. The decisive point is to recover a strong sense of permission that I equate with the factor of free agency, which is difficult to formalize. Finally, I return to the analysis of the nomothetic noema and try to show how a de re reading is better suited to account for normative intentionality. I simultaneously introduce the concept of status-imposing norms, which must be formulated with a normative use of the copulas “is” and “has.” I conclude that the treatment of normative expressions is more appropriate when they are understood as complex copulas, irreducible to assertive sentences, rather than as operators over whole sentences. I emphasize on this occasion that, from a phenomenological point of view and within the framework of genetic analysis, the primitive basic datum is the freedom of agency, on which the normative domain of assigning statuses to agents, obligations, and prohibitions is built. (shrink)

This paper is concerned with the reappraisal of Husserl’s ontology and epistemology, sketched in book one of Ideen. The main issue is Husserl’s theory of essence and essential insight. I present the fundamental distinction between facts and essences, and, over and above it, Husserl’s defense of an a priori knowledge based on essential insight as well as his partition of the whole realm of a priori knowledge into a formal set of material, regional ontologies. I will show how the theory (...) of essential insight presented in Ideen gives rise to several criticisms, namely those made by Neo-Kantians, like Rickert and Natorp. In the last part, I will show how the mathematical concept of an invariant under a group of variations was the leading case for Husserl’s mature notion of eidetic insight. (shrink)

While not a phenomenologist, Fernando Gil was highly interested in some aspects of Husserl’s work. One of these aspects was Husserl’s theory of evidence. ln a notable book entitled Traité de l’évidence, he developed a throughout theory of evidence, paying close attention to the most important insights Husserl exposed his works. Gil’s theory of evidence is at the same time rooted in Phenomenology and extended beyond it in as much as he locates the first dimension of evidence ma primitive stratum (...) hallucinating aesthesia from desire. Accounting for evidence as threefold process, going from aesthesia to presence, and then to the intellectual grasping of an individual object, the most interesting feature of his theory is the of evidence as a hallucinating process, encompassing all strata of sensitive, perceptive, and conceptual life. (shrink)

In this paper I discuss Berkeley’s theories about vision, perception of distance, and the foundations of Geometry. I start with Locke’s answer to Molineaux’s problem and the criticisms Berkeley addressed to it. I explain the fundamentais of Berkeley’s theory about our cognitive shaping of the visual field and the type of connections that visual data establishes with data from the haptic field. I show how interesting are Berkeley’s conceptions for a phenomenology of perception, and, eventually, I carried some phenomenological evidence (...) against Berkeley’s too much strict location of the idea of distance in the haptic field alone. (shrink)

In this paper I discuss the consistency and accuracy of Husserl’s sketch of a theory about non-declarative sentences in the last chapter of Logical Investigations. Whereas the consistency is acknowledged, the accuracy is denied, because Husserl’s treatment of non-declarative phrases such as questions or orders implies that those phrases contain, in some way, a declarative sentence and an objectifying act. To construct a question like “is A B?” as being equivalent to a pseudo-declarative sentence such as “I ask whether A (...) is B” is, however, a false phenomenological analysis, because to ask o r to order or to beg is not to assert. I turn, then, to John Austin ‘s theory of performative (as opposed to constatative) utterances and illocutionary acts in order to find a more accurate approach to the logical-semantic content of non-declarative sentences. Eventually, I show how this Husserlian theory of non-declarative sentences has a negative impact on the phenomenological theory of social ·acts and communication. (shrink)

I intend to understand from a phenomenological point of view the relationship between figurative consciousnesses (Bildbewusstsein) and other non-original presentations (Vergegenwiirtigungen) such as expectations, recollections or fantasies. I centre my analyses in the difference between figurative consciousness, on the one hand, and a modality of fantasy I cal! “daydream consciousness”, on the other. I stress that figurative consciousness implies apure observational ego, whereas day-dream consciousness is a free construction of the ego’s own personal story. The freedom of”day dream consciousness” has, (...) nevertheless, some important constraints. I emphasize the constraints that come from the passive and affective life of the ego. Finally, I propose new criteria for the phenomenological differentiation between the several kinds of acts of non-original presentation. (shrink)

O seguinte artigo tem como objetivo apresentar a interpretação realizada pelo filósofo e místico alemão Mestre Eckhart, das figuras de Marta e Maria no sermão de número 86 A Excelência de Marta sobre Maria. Apoiado neste sermão, faremos algumas análises filosóficas dos conceitos de vida contemplativa e vida ativa, pois compreendemos que ao realizar a interpretação da superioridade de Marta sobre Maria, Mestre Eckhart estabelece um novo paradigma interpretativo da vida contemplativa e ativa na filosofia medieval. Palavras-chaves: Mestre Eckhart. Mística. (...) Vida contemplativa. Vida ativa. Marta e Maria. (shrink)

In this paper, I examine some important features of Brentano’s and Rosenthal’s theories of consciousness and self-consciousness. In particular, I discuss the distinction between mental states and conscious states, and the related question of determining whether all mental states can become conscious states. I interpret Brentano’s theory as a one-level theory of mind which is in keeping with the Cartesian conflation between mental states and consciousness. I argue that the problems arising from Brentano’s position are to a certain extent surpassed (...) by a higher-order theory, so that Rosenthal’s position is more accurate. Nevertheless, I disagree with both in the construal of the consciousness of a mental state as self-consciousness. I develop then the fundamentals for a theory based on the primacy of the organism and its vital world, and of conscious experience as the higher form of mental life, which has, however, its roots in the complex net of mental states which are not conscious states. (shrink)